Betancourt rescue vindicates Colombian resolve

Ingrid Betancourt is finally out of the woods. After six and a half years held as a hostage by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the Colombian wilderness, the one-time presidential candidate was rescued last week by Colombian soldiers acting on orders from her former electoral opponent Alvaro Uribe.

Having spent such a long period in captivity, Betancourt appeared almost older than her mother in photos taken after her reunion with her family. She will doubtless carry the unpleasant memories of that period with her for life.

Still, she has been freed, and none too soon. The rescue of Betancourt and three Americans held captive by the FARC puts a face on the wider, hard-fought success of the Colombian government in its fight against the terrorist group.

The operation not only underscores these successes, but it also puts to rest the notion that challenges such as the Betancourt hostage situation can only be resolved through diplomacy.

Prior to the rescue, international pressure upon Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to negotiate was enormous. Many outsiders genuinely felt that anything other than appeasement would result in harm to the hostages and were understandably opposed to a rescue operation on these grounds. FARC supporters such as Hugo Chavez likely believed that pressuring Uribe to come to the negotiating table would give the terrorist organization new legitimacy and undermine the Colombian president.

Uribe rejected these arguments and sought to rescue Betancourt in a way that would minimize the risk of harming her or the other hostages while giving no hard-won ground to the FARC.

Instead of gaining legitimacy through the act of negotiation, FARC and its backers were dealt an embarrassing blow as Colombia’s military and intelligence services lured FARC operatives to a helicopter, disarmed them and snatched their captives in a brief scuffle without having to fire a shot. Although the Colombian army had a large task force ready nearby to attempt a more forceful rescue, FARC never caught on until it was too late.

Chavez proclaimed he was “overjoyed” by the rescue after about a day of awkward silence following the announcement. This more likely reflects Chavez’s loss of political capital in recent months more than any genuine sympathy on his part, given that Chavez has heavily portrayed himself as the only party capable of negotiating a release between FARC and the Colombian government.

We can expect similar attempts by Chavez to play the peacemaker in the future, but the success of Uribe’s hard-line stance — dramatically showcased by the bold rescue operation — will make them increasingly irrelevant.

The government of Ecuador, which has very closely aligned with Chavez, sent out a different message, saying, “It is a pity it happened not as part of a peace process, but as a violent rescue by the Colombian Armed Forces.” The phrase “violent rescue” is particularly silly, given the fact that the rescuers and hostages suffered no casualties and the rescue force never had to actually fire its weapons.

Betancourt was unusual in that she was held as a bargaining chip to persuade Uribe to concede territory or weaken his military campaign; most of FARC’s hostages are simply kidnapped for the ransom money.

Instead of attempting to impose negotiations, the international community needs to call for the unconditional release of the remaining hostages and offer greater support to the Colombian government’s war against the FARC.